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DP-ADMM: ADMM-based Distributed Learning
with Differential Privacy
Zonghao Huang, Rui Hu, Yuanxiong Guo, Eric Chan-Tin, and Yanmin Gong
Abstract—Alternating direction method of multipliers
(ADMM) is a widely used tool for machine learning in
distributed settings, where a machine learning model is trained
over distributed data sources through an interactive process
of local computation and message passing. Such an iterative
process could cause privacy concerns of data owners. The goal
of this paper is to provide differential privacy for ADMM-based
distributed machine learning. Prior approaches on differentially
private ADMM exhibit low utility under high privacy guarantee
and assume the objective functions of the learning problems to
be smooth and strongly convex. To address these concerns, we
propose a novel differentially private ADMM-based distributed
learning algorithm called DP-ADMM, which combines an
approximate augmented Lagrangian function with time-varying
Gaussian noise addition in the iterative process to achieve higher
utility for general objective functions under the same differential
privacy guarantee. We also apply the moments accountant
method to analyze the end-to-end privacy loss. The theoretical
analysis shows that DP-ADMM can be applied to a wider class
of distributed learning problems, is provably convergent, and
offers an explicit utility-privacy tradeoff. To our knowledge,
this is the first paper to provide explicit convergence and utility
properties for differentially private ADMM-based distributed
learning algorithms. The evaluation results demonstrate that
our approach can achieve good convergence and model accuracy
under high end-to-end differential privacy guarantee.
Index Terms—Machine learning, ADMM, distributed algo-
rithms, privacy, differential privacy, and moments accountant.
I. INTRODUCTION
D ISTRIBUTED machine learning is a widely adoptedapproach due to the high demand of large-scale and
distributed data processing. It allows multiple entities to keep
their datasets unexposed, and meanwhile to collaborate in
a common learning objective (usually formulated as a reg-
ularized empirical risk minimization problem) by iterative
local computation and message passing. Therefore, distributed
machine learning helps to reduce computational burden and
improves both robustness and scalability of data processing.
As pointed out in recent studies [1], [2], existing approaches
to decentralizing an optimization problem mainly consist of
subgradient-based algorithms [3], [4], alternating direction
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method of multipliers (ADMM) based algorithms [5]–[8],
and composite of sub-gradient descent and ADMM [9]. It
has been shown that ADMM-based algorithms can converge
at the rate of O(1/t) while subgradient-based algorithms
typically converge at the rate of O(1/
√
t), where t is the
number of iterations [10]. Therefore, ADMM has become a
popular method for designing distributed versions of a machine
learning algorithm [5], [8], [11], and our work focuses on
ADMM-based distributed learning.
With ADMM, the learning problem is divided into several
sub-problems solved by agents independently and locally, and
only intermediate parameters need to be shared. However,
the iterative process of ADMM involves privacy leakage,
and the adversary can obtain the sensitive information from
the shared model parameters as shown in [12], [13]. Thus,
we aim to limit the privacy leakage during the iterative
process of ADMM using differential privacy. Differential
privacy is a widely used privacy definition [14]–[16] and
can be guaranteed in ADMM through adding noise to the
exchanged messages. However, in existing studies on ADMM-
based distributed learning with differential privacy [1], [2],
[17]–[19], noise addition would disrupt the learning process
and severely degrade the performance of the trained model,
especially when large noise is needed to provide high privacy
protection. Besides, their privacy-preserving algorithms only
apply to the learning problems with both smoothness and
strongly convexity assumptions about the objective functions.
Such weaknesses and limitations motivate us to explore further
in this area.
In this paper, we mainly focus on using ADMM to enable
distributed learning while guaranteeing differential privacy,
and propose a novel differentially private ADMM-based dis-
tributed learning algorithm called DP-ADMM, which has good
convergence properties, low computational cost, and an ex-
plicit and improved utility-privacy tradeoff, and can be applied
to a wide class of distributed learning problems. The key
algorithmic feature of DP-ADMM is the combination of an
approximate augmented Lagrangian function and time-varying
Gaussian noise addition in the iterative process, which enables
the algorithm to be noise-resilient and provably convergent.
The moments accountant method [20] is used to analyze the
end-to-end privacy guarantee of DP-ADMM. We also rigor-
ously analyze the convergence rate and utility bound of our
approach. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to provide
explicit convergence and utility properties for differentially
private ADMM-based distributed learning algorithms.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
21) We design a novel differentially private ADMM-based
distributed learning algorithm called DP-ADMM, which
combines an approximate augmented Lagrangian func-
tion with time-varying Gaussian noise addition in the
iterative process to achieve higher utility for more gen-
eral objective functions than prior works under the same
differential privacy guarantee.
2) Different from previous studies providing only differ-
ential privacy guarantee for each iteration, we use the
moments accountant method to analyze the total privacy
loss and provide a tight end-to-end differential privacy
guarantee for DP-ADMM.
3) We provide rigorous convergence and utility analysis
of the proposed DP-ADMM. To our knowledge, this
is the first paper to provide explicit convergence and
utility properties for differentially private ADMM-based
distributed learning algorithms.
4) We conduct extensive simulations based on real-world
datasets to validate the effectiveness of DP-ADMM in
distributed learning settings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present our problem statement. In Section III, we describe
a differentially private standard ADMM-based algorithm and
propose our DP-ADMM. In Section IV and Section V, we
theoretically analyze our privacy guarantee and convergence
and utility properties of DP-ADMM, respectively. The numer-
ical results of DP-ADMM based on real-world datasets are
shown in Section VI. Section VII discusses the related work,
and Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we first introduce the problem setting. Then
we present the standard ADMM-based distributed learning
algorithm and discuss the associated privacy concern. A sum-
mary of notations used in this paper is listed in Table I.
A. Problem Setting
We consider a set of agents [n] := {1, . . . , n} and a central
aggregator. Each agent i ∈ [n] has a private training dataset
Di := {(ai,j , bi,j) : ∀j ∈ [mi]}, where mi is the number
of training samples in the dataset Di, ai,j ∈ Rd is the d-
dimensional data feature vector of the j-th training sample,
and bi,j ∈ Rp is the corresponding p-dimensional data label.
In this paper, we consider a star network topology where each
agent can communicate with the central aggregator and the
aggregator is responsible for message passing and aggregation.
Note that our approach can be generalized to other network
topologies where agents are connected with their neighbors
without a central aggregator, as discussed in [1], [2], [17].
The goal of our problem is to train a supervised learning
model on the aggregated dataset {Di}i∈[n], which enables
predicting a label for any new data feature vector. The learning
objective can be formulated as the following regularized
empirical risk minimization problem:
min
w
n∑
i=1
mi∑
j=1
1
mi
ℓ(ai,j , bi,j ,w) + λR(w), (1)
TABLE I: List of notations
ai,j Data feature vector
bi,j Data label
ℓ(·) Loss function
R(·) Regularizer function
λ Regularizer parameter
ℓ
′
(·) Subgradient of loss function
R
′
(·) Subgradient of regularizer
∇ℓ(·) Gradient of loss function
∇R(·) Gradient of regularizer
w Global machine learning model
wi Local learning model from agent i
γi Dual variable from agent i
ρ Penalty parameter
Lρ(·) Augmented Lagrangian function
Lˆρ,k(·) Approximate augmented Lagrangian function
wki Primal variable from agent i in k-th iteration
w˜ki Noisy version of w
k
i after perturbation
γki Dual variable from agent i in k-th iteration
wk Global variable in k-th iteration
ξki Sampled noise from agent i in k-th iteration
σ2i Constant variance of Gaussian mechanism
ηki Time-varying step size in k-th iteration
σ2i,k Time-varying variance of Gaussian mechanism
where w ∈ Rd×p is the trained machine learning model,
ℓ(·) : Rd×Rp×Rd×p → R is the loss function used to measure
the quality of the trained model, R(·) refers to the regularizer
function introduced to prevent overfitting, and λ > 0 is the
regularizer parameter controlling the impact of regularizer.
Note that the problem formulation (1) can represent a wide
range of machine learning tasks by choosing different loss
functions. For instance, the loss function of binary logistic
regression is:
ℓ(ai,j , bi,j ,w) = ln
(
1 + exp(−bi,jw⊺ai,j)
)
, (2)
and the loss function of multi-class logistic regression is:
ℓ(ai,j , bi,j ,w) =
p∑
h=1
b
(h)
i,j ln
(∑p
l=1 exp(w
(l)⊺ai,j)
exp(w(h)
⊺
ai,j)
)
. (3)
In this paper, we assume that the loss function ℓ(·) and the
regularizer function R(·) are both convex but not necessarily
smooth. Throughout this paper, we use ℓ
′
(·) and R′(·) to
denote the sub-gradient of ℓ(·) and R(·) respectively. When we
consider smooth functions, we use ∇ℓ(·) and ∇R(·) instead.
B. ADMM-Based Distributed Learning Algorithm
To apply ADMM, we re-formulate the problem (1) as:
min
{wi}i∈[n]
n∑
i=1
( mi∑
j=1
1
mi
ℓ(ai,j , bi,j ,wi) +
λ
n
R(wi)
)
, (4a)
s.t. wi = w, i = 1, . . . , n, (4b)
where wi ∈ Rd×p is the local model, and w ∈ Rd×p is the
global one. The objective function (4a) is decoupled and each
agent only needs to minimize the sub-problem associated with
its dataset. Constraints (4b) enforce that all the local models
reach consensus finally.
3In standard ADMM, the augmented Lagrangian function
associated with the problem (4) is:
Lρ(w, {wi}i∈[n], {γi}i∈[n]) =
n∑
i=1
Lρ,i(wi,w,γi), (5)
where
Lρ,i(wi,w,γi) =
mi∑
j=1
1
mi
ℓ(ai,j , bi,j ,wi) +
λ
n
R(wi)
− 〈γi,wi −w〉+ ρ2‖wi −w‖2.
(6)
In (6), {γi}i∈[n] ∈ Rd×p×n are the dual variables associated
with constraints (4b) and ρ > 0 is the penalty parameter. The
standard ADMM solves the problem (4) in a Gauss-Seidel
manner by minimizing (5) w.r.t. {wi}i∈[n] and w alternatively
followed by a dual update of {γi}i∈[n]. The ADMM-based
distributed algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 ADMM-Based Distributed Algorithm
1: Initialize w0, {w0i }i∈[n], and {γ0i }i∈[n];
2: for k = 1, 2, . . . , t do
3: for i = 1, 2, . . . , n do
4: wki ← argminwi Lρ,i(wi,wk−1,γk−1i );
5: end for
6: wk ← 1n
∑n
i=1w
k
i − 1n
∑n
i=1 γ
k−1
i /ρ;
7: for i = 1, 2, . . . , n do
8: γki ← γk−1i − ρ(wki −wk).
9: end for
10: end for
C. Privacy Concern
In Algorithm 1, the intermediate parameters {wki }i∈[n],k∈[t]
need to be shared with the aggregator, which may reveal
the agents’ private information as demonstrated by model
inversion attacks [21]. Thus, we need to develop privacy-
preserving methods to control such information leakage. The
main goal of this paper is to provide privacy protection
against inference attacks from an adversary, who tries to infer
sensitive information about the agents’ private datasets from
the shared messages. We assume that the adversary can neither
intrude into the local datasets nor have access to the datasets
directly. The adversary could be an outsider who eavesdrops
the shared messages, or the honest-but-curious aggregator who
follows the protocol honestly but tends to infer the sensitive
information. We do not assume any trusted third party, thus
a privacy-preserving mechanism should be applied locally by
each agent to provide privacy protection.
In order to provide privacy guarantee against such attacks,
we define our privacy model formally by the notion of differ-
ential privacy [14]. Specifically, we adopt the (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy defined as follows:
Definition 1 ((ǫ, δ)-Differential Privacy). A randomized mech-
anism M is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if for any two neigh-
bouring datasets D and D′ differing in only one tuple, and
for any subsets of outputs O ⊆ range(M):
Pr[M(D) ∈ O] ≤ eǫ · Pr[M(D′) ∈ O] + δ, (7)
which means, with probability of at least 1 − δ, the ratio of
the probability distributions for two neighboring datasets is
bounded by eǫ.
In Definition 1, the parameters δ and ǫ are privacy bud-
gets indicating the strength of privacy protection from the
mechanism. Smaller ǫ or δ indicates better privacy protection.
Gaussian mechanism is a common randomization method used
to guarantee (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, where noise sampled
from normal distribution is added to the output. In this paper,
we use MN d,p(0, σ2Id, σ2Ip) to denote the matrix normal
distribution with variance σ2.
III. ADMM WITH DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In this section, we achieve differential privacy under the
framework of ADMM. First, we introduce an intuitive method
by directly combining standard ADMM and primal variable
perturbation (PVP) and discuss the weaknesses of this method.
Then we propose our new approach to achieving differential
privacy in ADMM with an improved utility-privacy tradeoff.
A. ADMM with Primal Variable Perturbation (PVP)
As described in Section II, we need to use a local privacy-
preserving mechanism in order to guarantee (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy for each agent. An intuitive way to achieve this goal is
to combine the primal variable perturbation mechanism (PVP)
and standard ADMM directly as proposed in [17]. Specifically,
as given in Algorithm 2, at the k-th iteration, after obtaining
the local primal variable wki , we apply Gaussian mechanism
with a pre-defined variance σ2i to perturb it and share the
noisy primal variable w˜ki , which can guarantee differential
privacy. According to [22], [23], by assuming the smoothness
of loss function l(·) and regularizer function R(·), strongly
convexity of regularizer R(·), and the bounded l2 norm of
the derivative of loss function by c1, the l2 sensitivity of w
k
i
update function in standard ADMM is 2c1/
(
mi(λ/n + ρ)
)
as proved in Appendix A. Therefore, the noise magnitude
σi = 2c1
√
2 ln(1.25/δ)/
(
(λ/n + ρ)miǫ
)
can achieve (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy in each iteration.
Algorithm 2 ADMM with PVP
1: Initialize w0, {w0i }i∈[n], and {γ0i }i∈[n].
2: for k = 1, 2, . . . , t do
3: for i = 1, 2, . . . , n do
4: wki ← argminwi Lρ,i(wi,wk−1,γk−1i ).
5: w˜ki ← wki +MN d,p(0, σ2i Id, σ2i Ip).
6: end for
7: wk ← 1n
∑n
i=1 w˜
k
i − 1n
∑n
i=1 γ
k−1
i /ρ.
8: for i = 1, 2, . . . , n do
9: γki ← γk−1i − ρ(w˜ki −wk).
10: end for
11: end for
However, the added noise from the perturbation mechanism
would disrupt the learning process, break the convergence
property of the iterative process, and lead to a trained model
with poor performance. This is especially the case when
4the privacy budget is small. Specifically, when the iteration
number k is large, the trained model would keep changing
dramatically due to the existence of large noise. Besides, the
above perturbation method can only be applied when the
objective function is smooth and the regularizer is strongly
convex [17], [23]. In order to address such problems, we need
to consider an alternative way to preserving differential privacy
of ADMM-based distributed learning algorithms.
B. Our Approach
Our approach is inspired by the intuition that it is not
necessary to solve the problem up to a very high precision in
each iteration in order to guarantee the overall convergence. In
our approach, instead of using the exact augmented Lagrangian
function, we employ its first-order approximation with a scalar
l2-norm prox-function. Here we define:
Lˆρ,k,i(wi, w˜k−1i ,w,γi)
=
mi∑
j=1
1
mi
ℓ(ai,j , bi,j , w˜
k−1
i ) +
λ
n
R(w˜k−1i )
+
〈 mi∑
j=1
1
mi
ℓ
′
(ai,j , bi,j , w˜
k−1
i ) +
λ
n
R
′
(w˜k−1i ),wi − w˜k−1i
〉
− 〈γi,wi −w〉+ ρ2‖wi −w‖2 + ‖wi − w˜
k−1
i ‖
2
2ηki
,
(8)
where ηki ∈ R is the time-varying step size, and it decreases
as the iteration number k increases.
The proposed approximate augmented Lagrangian function
used in our approach is defined by:
Lˆρ,k({wi}i∈[n], {w˜k−1i }i∈[n],w, {γi}i∈[n])
=
n∑
i=1
Lˆρ,k,i(wi, w˜k−1i ,w,γi).
(9)
Our approach minimizes (9) in a Gauss-Seidel manner and
adds zero-mean Gaussian noise with time-varying variance
σ2i,k that decreases as the iteration number k increases.
The resulting ADMM steps that provide differential privacy
are as follows:
wki =argmin
wi
Lˆρ,k,i(wi, w˜k−1i ,wk−1,γk−1i ), (10a)
w˜ki =w
k
i +MN d,p(0, σ2i,kId, σ2i,kIp), (10b)
wk =
1
n
n∑
i=1
w˜ki −
1
n
n∑
i=1
γk−1i /ρ, (10c)
γki =γ
k−1
i − ρ(w˜ki −wk), (10d)
where (10c) is computed at the aggregator while (10a), (10b)
and (10d) are performed at each agent.
The details are given in Algorithm 3. The central aggregator
firstly initializes the global variable w0, and the agents also
initialize their noisy primal variables {w˜0i }i∈[n] and dual
variables {γ0i }i∈[n]. At the beginning of each iteration k, each
agent i first samples a zero-mean Gaussian noise ξki with
variance σ2i,k and updates the noisy primal variable w˜
k
i based
on (10a) and (10b). Then the aggregator receives the noisy
primal variables {w˜ki }i∈[n] and the dual variables {γk−1i }i∈[n]
from the agents, and uses them to update the global variable
wk according to (10c). After that, agents receive the updated
global variable wk from the aggregator and continue to update
the dual variables {γki }i∈[n] by (10d). The iterative process
will continue until reaching t iterations.
Algorithm 3 DP-ADMM
1: Initialize w0, {w˜0i }i∈[n], and {γ0i }i∈[n].
2: for k = 1, 2, . . . , t do
3: for i = 1, 2, . . . , n do
4: wki ← argminwi Lˆρ,k,i(wi, w˜k−1i ,wk−1,γk−1i ).
5: ξki ←MN d,p(0, σ2i,kId, σ2i,kIp).
6: w˜ki ← wki + ξki .
7: end for
8: wk ← 1n
∑n
i=1 w˜
k
i − 1n
∑n
i=1 γ
k−1
i /ρ.
9: for i = 1, 2, . . . , n do
10: γki ← γk−1i − ρ(w˜ki −wk).
11: end for
12: end for
Algorithm 3 is different from Algorithm 2 in three aspects.
Firstly, the approximate augmented Lagrangian function used
in this approach replaces the objective function with its
first-order approximation at w˜k−1i , which is similar to the
stochastic mirror descent [24]. This approximation enforces
the smoothness of the Lagrangian function and makes it easy
to solve (10a). Even when the objective function is non-
smooth, we can still get a closed-form solution to (10a), which
achieves fast computation. More importantly, this approxima-
tion can lead to a bounded l2 sensitivity in differential privacy
guarantee without the limitation that the objective function
should be smooth and strongly convex. Thus our approach
can be applied to any convex problems. We demonstrate this
in Section IV.
Secondly, similar to linearized ADMM [25], [26], there
is an l2-norm prox-function ‖wi − w˜k−1i ‖
2
but scaled by
1/2ηki added in (8), where the step size η
k
i decreases when
the iteration number k increases. Such additional part can
guarantee the consistency between the updated model wki
and the previous one, especially when k is large. Thus, as
k increases, the updated model would change more smoothly.
Note that the time-varying step-size ηki is significant for the
overall convergence guarantee. In Section V, we will define
ηki and show its importance in algorithmic convergence.
Lastly, the variance σ2i,k of Gaussian mechanism used in
Algorithm 3 is time-varying rather than constant as adopted
in prior studies [20]. It decreases when the iteration number
k increases. The motivation of using Gaussian mechanism
with time-varying variance is to mitigate the negative effect
from noise and guarantee the convergence property of our
approach. As explained before, the added noise would disrupt
the learning process. By using the Gaussian mechanism with
time-varying variance, the added noise will decrease when the
iteration number k increases. Therefore, the negative affect
from the added noise will be mitigated, enabling the updates
5to be stable. In Section IV, we would define the magnitude of
time-varying variance σ2i,k to achieve differential privacy.
IV. PRIVACY GUARANTEE
In this section, we analyze the privacy guarantee of the
proposed DP-ADMM. In DP-ADMM, the shared messages
{w˜ki }k∈[t] may reveal the sensitive information of agent i,
which has been discussed in Section II. Thus, we need to
demonstrate that DP-ADMM guarantees differential privacy
with outputs {w˜ki }k∈[t]. We first estimate the l2 norm sensi-
tivity of wki update function, then analyze the privacy leakage
from the shared primal variable w˜ki in each iteration, and
finally compute the end-to-end differential privacy guarantee
across t iterations using the moments accountant method. Here
we use wki,Di and w
k
i,D
′
i
to denote the local primal variables
updated from two neighboring datasets Di and D′i.
A. L2-norm Sensitivity
In our approach, we apply Gaussian mechanism to add noise
whose magnitude is calibrated by the l2-norm sensitivity. Note
that compared with Algorithm 2 and prior works [1], [2], [17],
the derivation of the sensitivity in our proposed algorithm does
not require the assumption of smoothness and strong convexity
of the objective function due to the first-order approximation
used in the approximate augmented Lagrangian function.
Lemma 1. Assume that ‖ℓ′(·)‖ ≤ c1. The l2-norm sensitivity
of local primal variable wki update function is given by:
max
Di,D
′
i
‖wki,Di −wki,D′
i
‖ = 2c1
mi(ρ+ 1/ηki )
. (11)
Proof. Since Lˆρ,k,i(wi, w˜k−1i ,wk−1,γk−1i ) in the first step
of DP-ADMM (10a) is a quadratic function w.r.t. wi and
therefore convex, we could obtain that:
wki,Di =
(
−
mi∑
j=1
1
mi
ℓ
′
(ai,j , bi,j , w˜
k−1
i )−
λ
n
R
′
(w˜k−1i )
+γk−1i + ρw
k−1 +
w˜
k−1
i
ηki
)(
ρ+ 1/ηki
)−1
, (12a)
wk
i,D
′
i
=
(
−
mi−1∑
j=1
1
mi
ℓ
′
(ai,j , bi,j , w˜
k−1
i )
− 1
mi
ℓ
′
(a
′
i,mi , b
′
i,mi , w˜
k−1
i )−
λ
n
R
′
(w˜k−1i )
+γk−1i + ρw
k−1 +
w˜k−1i
ηki
)(
ρ+ 1/ηki
)−1
, (12b)
by computing the derivative of (8) with inputswk−1 and γk−1i
and letting ∇Lˆρ,k,i(wi, w˜k−1i ,wk−1,γk−1i ) to be 0.
With wki,Di and w
k
i,D
′
i
calculated by (12a) and (12b) respec-
tively, the l2-norm sensitivity of primal variable w
k
i update
function is defined by:
max
Di,D
′
i
‖wki,Di −wki,D′
i
‖
= max
Di,D
′
i
∥∥ℓ′(ai,mi ,bi,mi , w˜k−1i )− ℓ′(a′i,mi , b′i,mi , w˜k−1i )∥∥
mi(ρ+ 1/ηki )
.
(13)
Since ‖ℓ′(·)‖ is bounded by c1, the sensitivity of wki update
function is given by 2c1/
(
mi(ρ+ 1/η
k
i )
)
.
Lemma 1 shows that the sensitivity of wki update function
in our approach is affected by the time-varying ηki . When we
set ηki to decrease with increasing k, the sensitivity becomes
smaller with larger k, then the noise added would be smaller
when ǫ is fixed. Thus, the updates would be stable in spite of
the existence of the noise.
B. (ǫ, δ)-Differential Privacy Guarantee
In this section, we prove that each iteration of Algorithm 3
guarantees (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
Theorem 1. Assume that ‖ℓ′(·)‖ ≤ c1. Let ǫ ∈ (0, 1]
be arbitrary and ξki be the noise sampled from Gaussian
mechanism with variance σ2i,k where
σi,k =
2c1
√
2 ln(1.25/δ)
miǫ(ρ+ 1/ηki )
. (14)
Each iteration of DP-ADMM guarantees (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy. Specifically, for any neighboring datasets Di and D′i,
for any output w˜ki , the following inequality always holds:
Pr[w˜ki |Di] ≤ eǫ · Pr[w˜ki |D
′
i] + δ. (15)
Proof. The privacy loss from w˜ki is calculated as∣∣∣∣ ln Pr[w˜ki |Di]Pr[w˜ki |D′i]
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣ ln Pr[w˜k
(h,l)
i |Di]
Pr[w˜k
(h,l)
i |D′i]
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣ ln Pr[ξk
(h,l)
i ]
Pr[ξk,
′(h,l)
i ]
∣∣∣∣,
(16)
where ξk
(h,l)
i and ξ
k,′(h,l)
i are the (h, l)-entry of ξ
k
i and ξ
k,′
i ,
and are sampled from N (0, σ2i,k). This leads to:∣∣∣∣ ln Pr[w˜ki |Di]Pr[w˜ki |D′i]
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣ 12σ2i,k
(∥∥ξk(h,l)i ∥∥2 − ∥∥ξk,′(h,l)i ∥∥2)∣∣
=
∣∣ 1
2σ2i,k
(‖ξk(h,l)i ‖2 − ‖ξk(h,l)i + (wk(h,l)i,Di − wk(h,l)i,D′
i
)‖2)∣∣
=
∣∣ 1
2σ2i,k
(
2ξk
(h,l)
i ‖wk
(h,l)
i,Di − wk
(h,l)
i,D
′
i
‖+ ‖wk(h,l)i,Di − wk
(h,l)
i,D
′
i
‖2)∣∣.
(17)
Since ‖ℓ′(·)‖ ≤ c1, according to Lemma 1, we have ‖wk(h,l)i,Di −
wk
(h,l)
i,D
′
i
‖ < ‖wki,Di −wki,D′
i
‖ ≤ 2c1/
(
mi(ρ+1/η
k
i )
)
. Thus, by
letting σi,k = 2c1
√
2 ln(1.25/δ)/
(
miǫ(ρ+ 1/η
k
i )
)
, we have∣∣∣∣ ln Pr[w˜ki |Di]Pr[w˜ki |D′i]
∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣ξk
(h,l)
i mi(ρ+ 1/η
k
i ) + c1
4 ln(1.25/δ)c1/ǫ2
∣∣∣∣. (18)
When |ξk(h,l)i | ≤
(
4 ln(1.25/δ)c1/ǫ − c1
)
/
(
ǫmi(ρ + 1/η
k
i )
)
,∣∣ ln (Pr[w˜ki |Di]/Pr[w˜ki |D′i])∣∣ is bounded by ǫ. Next, we
need to prove that Pr
[|ξk(h,l)i | > (4 ln(1.25/δ)c1/ǫ −
c1
)
/
(
ǫmi(ρ + 1/η
k
i )
)] ≤ δ, which requires Pr [ξk(h,l)i >(
4 ln(1.25/δ)c1/ǫ− c1
)
/
(
ǫmi(ρ+1/η
k
i )
)] ≤ δ/2. According
to the tail bound of normal distribution N (0, σ2i,k), we have
Pr
[
ξk
(h,l)
i > r
] ≤ σi,k
r
√
2π
e−r
2/2σ2i,k . (19)
6By letting r =
(
4 ln(1.25/δ)c1/ǫ − c1
)
/
(
ǫmi(ρ + 1/η
k
i )
)
in
the above inequality, we have:
Pr
[
ξk
(h,l)
i >
4 ln(1.25/δ)c1/ǫ− c1
mi(ρ+ 1/ηki )
]
≤ 2
√
2 ln(1.25/δ)
(4 ln(1.25/δ)− ǫ)√2π exp
(
− (4 ln(1.25/δ)− ǫ)
2
8 ln(1.25/δ)
)
.
(20)
When δ is small (≤ 0.01) and let ǫ ≤ 1, we have
2
√
2 ln(1.25/δ)
(4 ln(1.25/δ)− ǫ)√2π <
1√
2π
, (21)
and
−
(
4 ln(1.25/δ)− ǫ)2
8 ln(1.25/δ)
< ln(
√
2π
δ
2
). (22)
As a result, we have:
Pr
[
ξk
(h,l)
i >
4 ln(1.25/δ)c1/ǫ− c1
mi(ρ+ 1/ηki )
]
<
δ
2
. (23)
So far we have proved that Pr
[
ξk
(h,l)
i >
(
4 ln(1.25/δ)c1/ǫ−
c1
)
/
(
ǫmi(ρ + 1/η
k
i )
)] ≤ δ/2, thus we can prove that
Pr
[|ξk(h,l)i | > (4 ln(1.25/δ)c1/ǫ−c1)/(ǫmi(ρ+1/ηki ))] ≤ δ.
We define:
A1 ={ξk(h,l)i : |ξk
(h,l)
i | ≤
4 ln(1.25/δ)c1/ǫ− c1
mi(ρ+ 1/ηki )
}, (24a)
A2 ={ξk(h,l)i : |ξk
(h,l)
i | >
4 ln(1.25/δ)c1/ǫ− c1
mi(ρ+ 1/ηki )
}. (24b)
Therefore, we obtain the result:
Pr[w˜ki |Di] =Pr[wk
(h,l)
i,Di + ξ
k(h,l)
i : ξ
k(h,l)
i ∈ A1]
+ Pr[wk
(h,l)
i,Di + ξ
k(h,l)
i : ξ
k(h,l)
i ∈ A2]
<eǫ · Pr[w˜ki |D
′
i] + δ,
(25)
which proves that each iteration of DP-ADMM guarantees
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
C. Total Privacy Leakage
We have proved that each iteration of the proposed algo-
rithm is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private. Here we focus on the total
privacy leakage of our algorithm. Since Algorithm 3 is a t-fold
adaptive algorithm, we follow prior studies [20], [27] and use
the moments accountant method to analyze the total privacy
leakage.
Theorem 2 (Advanced Composition Theorem). Assume
‖ℓ′(·)‖ ≤ c1. Let ǫ ∈ (0, 1] be arbitrary and ξki be sampled
from Gaussian mechanism with variance σ2i,k where
σi,k =
2c1
√
2 ln(1.25/δ)
miǫ(ρ+ 1/ηki )
. (26)
Then Algorithm 3 guarantees (ǫ¯, δ)-differential privacy, where
ǫ¯ = c0
√
tǫ for some constant c0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
V. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the convergence of the proposed
DP-ADMM. Let w∗ denote the optimal solution of problem
(4), and cw denote ‖w∗‖. Firstly, we analyze the convergence
property based on the general assumption that the objective
function is convex and non-smooth. Secondly, we refine the
convergence property under a stricter assumption that the
objective function is convex and smooth.
We define the following notations to be used for the
analysis:
fi(wi) =
mi∑
j=1
1
mi
ℓ(ai,j , bi,j ,wi) +
λ
n
R(wi),
w¯t =
1
t
t∑
k=1
wk, γ¯ti =
1
t
t∑
k=1
γki , w¯
t
i =
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
w˜ki ,
uki =

w˜kiwk
γki

 , ui =

wiw
γi

 , F (uki ) =

 −γkiγki
w˜ki −wk

 .
We show that DP-ADMM achieves an O(1/
√
t) rate of
convergence in terms of both the objective value and the
constraint violation:
∑n
i=1
(
fi(w¯
t
i)− fi(w∗)+β‖w¯ti− w¯t‖
)
,
where
∑n
i=1
(
fi(w¯
t
i) − fi(w∗)
)
represents the distance be-
tween the current objective value and the optimal value
while
∑n
i=1 β‖w¯ti − w¯t‖ measures the difference between
the local model and the global one. Therefore, when we have∑n
i=1
(
fi(w¯
t
i) − fi(w∗) + β‖w¯ti − w¯t‖
)
= 0, our training
result converges to the optimal one and all local models reach
consensus.
A. Non-Smooth Convex Objective Function
In this section, we analyze the convergence when the ob-
jective function is convex but non-smooth. We firstly analyze
a single iteration of our algorithm in Lemma 2 and then give
the convergence result of DP-ADMM in Theorem 3.
Lemma 2. Assume ℓ(·) and R(·) are convex. For any k ≥ 1,
we have:
n∑
i=1
(
fi(w˜
k−1
i )− fi(wi) + (uki − ui)
⊺
F (uki )
)
≤
n∑
i=1
(
ηki
2
∥∥f ′i (w˜k−1i )− (ρ+ 1/ηki )ξki ∥∥2 − ρ2‖wi −wk‖2
+
ρ
2
‖wi −wk−1‖2 −
(
ρ+ 1/ηki
)〈
ξki ,wi − w˜k−1i
〉
+
1
2ηki
‖wi − w˜k−1i ‖
2 − 1
2ηki
‖wi − w˜ki ‖
2
+
1
2ρ
‖γi − γk−1i ‖
2 − 1
2ρ
‖γi − γki ‖
2
)
.
(28)
Proof. See Appendix D.
Based on Lemma 2, we give the following convergence
theorem.
7Theorem 3. Assume ℓ(·) and R(·) are convex, ‖ℓ′(·)‖ ≤ c1,
and ‖R′(·)‖ ≤ c2. Let
ηki =
cw√
2k
(
(c1 + λc2/n)
2 +
8dpc21 ln (1.25/δ)
m2i ǫ
2
)− 12
. (29)
Define
M1(ǫ, δ) =
n∑
i=1
cw
√
2(c1 + λc2/n)2 +
16dpc21 ln (1.25/δ)
m2i ǫ
2
,
(30)
and
M2 =
n(ρc2w + β
2/ρ)
2
. (31)
For any t ≥ 1 and β, we have:
E
[ n∑
i=1
(
fi(w¯
t
i)− fi(w∗) + β‖w¯ti − w¯t‖
)]
≤ M1(ǫ, δ)√
t
+
M2
t
.
(32)
Proof. See Appendix E.
Theorem 3 shows an explicit utility-privacy trade-off of our
approach: when privacy guarantee is weaker (larger ǫ and δ),
our approach has better utility. In addition, it demonstrates that
our algorithm converges at a rate of O(1/
√
t).
B. Smooth Convex Objective Function
In this section, we refine Theorem 3 under a stricter
assumption that ℓ(·) and R(·) are both convex and smooth.
Here, we replace the definition of w¯ti: w¯
t
i =
1
t
∑t−1
k=0 w˜
k
i by
w¯ti =
1
t
∑t
k=1 w˜
k
i . Similar to Section V-A, we first focus on
a single iteration and then give the final convergence result.
Lemma 3. Assume ℓ(·) and R(·) are convex and smooth,
‖∇2ℓ(·)‖ ≤ c3, and ‖∇2R(·)‖ ≤ c4. For any k ≥ 1, we
have:
n∑
i=1
(
fi(w˜
k
i )− fi(wi) + (uki − ui)
⊺
F (uki )
)
≤
n∑
i=1
( (
ρ+ 1/ηki
)2
2/ηki − 2(c3 + λc4/n)
∥∥ξki ∥∥2 − 12ηki ‖wi − w˜ki ‖
2
+
1
2ηki
‖wi − w˜k−1i ‖
2 − (ρ+ 1/ηki )〈ξki ,wi − w˜k−1i 〉
+
ρ
2
‖wi −wk−1‖2 − ρ
2
‖wi −wk‖2
+
1
2ρ
‖γi − γk−1i ‖
2 − 1
2ρ
‖γi − γki ‖
2
)
.
(33)
Proof. See Appendix F.
Based on Lemma 3, we give the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Assume ℓ(·) and R(·) are convex and smooth,
‖∇2ℓ(·)‖ ≤ c3, and ‖∇2R(·)‖ ≤ c4. Let
ηki =
(
c3 + λc4/n+
4c1
√
dpk ln(1.25/δ)
miǫcw
)−1
. (34)
Define
M3(ǫ, δ) =
n∑
i=1
4cwc1
√
dp ln(1.25/δ)
miǫ
, (35)
and
M4 =
nc2w(c3 + λc4/n+ ρ) + nβ
2/ρ
2
. (36)
For any t ≥ 1 and β, we have:
E
[ n∑
i=1
(
fi(w¯
t
i)−fi(w∗)+β‖w¯ti−w¯t‖
)]
≤ M3(ǫ, δ)√
t
+
M4
t
.
(37)
Proof. See Appendix G.
Theorem 4 also shows an explicit relation between the
privacy budget (i.e., ǫ and δ) and the utility of our approach
with smoothness, and demonstrates that the result from our
algorithm converges to the optimal result at a rate of O(1/
√
t).
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of DP-ADMM
with both non-smooth objectives and smooth objectives by
considering logistic regression problems with l1-norm and l2-
norm regularizers, respectively.
Dataset. We evaluate our approach on a real-world dataset:
Adult dataset [28] from UCI Machine Learning Repository.
Adult dataset includes 48, 842 instances. Each instance has
14 attributes such as age, sex, education, occupation, marital
status, and native country, and is associated with a label rep-
resenting whether the income is above $50, 000 or not. Before
the simulation, we firstly preprocess the data by removing all
the instances with missing values, converting the categorical
attributes into binary vectors, normalizing columns to guaran-
tee the maximum value of each column is 1, normalizing rows
to enforce their l2 norm to be less than 1, and converting the
labels {> 50k,< 50k} into {+1,−1}. After this, we obtain
45, 222 entries each with a 104-dimensional feature vector
(d = 104) and a 1-dimensional label belonging to {+1,−1}
(p = 1). In each simulation, we sample 40, 000 instances for
training, and the remaining 5, 222 instances for testing. In the
training process, we divide the training data into n groups
randomly, and thus each group contains 40000/n data points
(mi = 40000/n).
Baseline algorithms. We compare our DP-ADMM (Al-
gorithm 3) with five baseline algorithms: (1) non-private
centralized approach, (2) ADMM algorithm (Algorithm 1), (3)
ADMM algorithm with PVP (Algorithm 2), (4) ADMM with
dual variable perturbation (DVP) in [17], and (5) differentially
private stochastic gradient descent (DPSGD) in [20] for dis-
tributed settings. We evaluate the accuracy and effectiveness of
our approach by comparing it with the five baseline algorithms.
Setup. We set up the simulation by MATLAB in an Intel(R)
Core(TM) 3.40 GHz computer with 16 GB RAM. In the
simulation, we set the total iteration number t = 100 and
the penalty parameter ρ = 0.1, and choose the optimal
regularizer parameter λ/n to be 10−6 by 10-cross-validation
in non-private setting. In DPSGD, we set the optimal learning
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Fig. 1: Impact of distributed data source number on DP-ADMM (l1-regularized logistic regression).
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Fig. 2: Convergence properties of DP-ADMM (l1-regularized logistic regression).
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Fig. 3: Accuracy comparison in empirical loss and classification error rate (l1-regularized logistic regression).
TABLE II: Computation Time (100 iterations).
ADMM PVP DVP DPADMM
ǫ = 0.01 67.242s 102.282s 59.743s 6.937s
ǫ = 0.05 67.242s 78.798s 65.935s 5.322s
ǫ = 0.1 67.242s 79.013s 69.855s 5.218s
rate to be 0.1 and the sampling ratio to be 1. We focus on
the settings with strong privacy guarantee and thus we set
privacy budget per iteration ǫ = {0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2} and
δ = {10−3, 10−4, 10−5, 10−6}, and use moments accountant
method to obtain the corresponding total privacy loss ǫ¯. In
each simulation, we run it for 10 times to get averaged result.
Evaluations. We consider logistic regression problem in
a distributed setting and evaluate our approach for logistic
regression problems with l1-norm and l2-norm regularizers
respectively, in terms of convergence, accuracy, and compu-
tation cost. The loss function of binary logistic regression is
defined by (2). The convergence properties are evaluated with
respect to the augmented objective value, which measures
the loss as well as the constraint penalty and is defined as∑n
i=1
(
fi(w¯
k
i ) + ρ‖w¯ki − w¯k‖
)
. We evaluate the accuracy by
empirical loss 1n
∑n
i=1
∑mi
j=1
1
mi
ℓ(ai,j , bi,j , w˜
k
i ), and classifi-
cation error rate. We measure the computation cost using the
running time of training.
A. L1-Regularized Logistic Regression
We obtain the DP-ADMM steps for l1 regularized logistic
regression by:
wki =
(
1
mi
mi∑
j=1
bi,jai,j
1 + exp(bi,jw˜
k−1⊺
i ai,j)
− λ
n
sgn(w˜k−1i )
+γk−1i + ρw
k−1 + w˜k−1i /η
k
i
)(
ρ+ 1/ηki
)−1
, (38a)
w˜ki =w
k
i +MN d,p(0, σ2i,kId, σ2i,kIp), (38b)
wk =
1
n
n∑
i=1
w˜ki −
1
n
n∑
i=1
γk−1i /ρ, (38c)
γki =γ
k−1
i − ρ
(
w˜ki −wk
)
, (38d)
where sgn(·) is the sign function.
Since the l1 regularized objective function is convex but
non-smooth, we apply Theorem 3 to set ηki . Since we en-
force ‖ℓ′(·)‖ ≤ 1 by data preprocessing, and we have
9‖R′(·)‖ ≤ √dp (d = 104 and p = 1), we set c1 = 1
and c2 =
√
104. We obtain w∗ by pre-training and set
cw to be 23. According to Theorem 3, we set η
k
i to be
23
(
2k(1 + 10−6
√
104/n)2 + 1664k ln (1.25/δ)/
(
m2i ǫ
2
))− 12 .
Since PVP and DVP cannot be applied when the objective
function is non-smooth, we only compare our approach with
ADMM and DPSGD in this section. We first investigate
the performance of our approach with different numbers of
distributed data sources and compare it with the centralized
approach. Figure 1 shows that the accuracy of our training
model would decrease if we consider larger number of data
sources. Since the size of local dataset is smaller for larger
number of agents, more noise should be introduced to guar-
antee the same level of differential privacy, thus degrading
the performance of the trained model. This is consistent with
Theorem 1 that the noise magnitude is scaled by 1/mi. In
following simulations, we consider the case when the number
of agents n equals 100. Figure 2 demonstrates the convergence
properties of our approach by showing how the augmented
objective value converges for different ǫ and δ. It shows that
our approach with larger ǫ and larger δ has better convergence,
which is consistent with Theorem 3. Finally, we evaluate the
accuracy of our approach by empirical loss and classification
error rate by comparing with ADMM and DPSGD. Figure
3 shows our approach outperforms DPSGD due to the faster
convergence property, demonstrating the advantage of ADMM
framework. In addition, Figure 3 shows the privacy-utility
trade-off of our approach. When privacy leakage increases
(larger ǫ and larger δ), our approach achieves better utility.
B. L2-Regularized Logistic Regression
The DP-ADMM steps for l2 regularized logistic regression
are described as follows:
wki =
(
1
mi
mi∑
j=1
bi,jai,j
1 + exp(bi,jw˜
k−1⊺
i ai,j)
− λ
n
w˜k−1i + γ
k−1
i
+ ρwk−1 + w˜k−1i /η
k
i
)(
ρ+ 1/ηki
)−1
, (39a)
w˜ki =w
k
i +MN d,p(0, σ2i,kId, σ2i,kIp), (39b)
wk =
1
n
n∑
i=1
w˜ki −
1
n
n∑
i=1
γk−1i /ρ, (39c)
γki =γ
k−1
i − ρ
(
w˜ki −wk
)
. (39d)
Here the l2 regularized objective function is convex and
smooth, thus we apply Theorem 4 to set ηki . Since we have
‖∇2R(·)‖ ≤ 1, and we enforce ‖∇ℓ(·)‖ ≤ 1 and ‖∇2ℓ(·)‖ ≤
0.25 by data preprocessing, thus we set c1 = 1, c3 = 0.25, and
c4 = 1. We obtain the optimal solution w
∗ by pre-training,
and set cw to be 89. According to Theorem 4, we set η
k
i to
be
(
0.25 + 10−6 + 2
√
416k ln(1.25/δ)/
(
89miǫ
))−1
.
We fist investigate the performance of our approach under
the settings with different numbers of distributed data sources
and Figure 4 depicts the corresponding accuracy changes
(accuracy decreases with increasing number of agents). Since
the total data size is fixed, when we consider a larger number
of agents, the size of local dataset is smaller, so the training
model has lower accuracy due to more added noise for the
same level of privacy guarantee. In the following simulations,
we focus on the case where the number of agents is 100. Next,
we show the convergence properties of our approach. Figure
5 demonstrates that under weaker privacy guarantee (larger
ǫ and larger δ), our approach has better convergence, which
is consistent with Theorem 4. We evaluate the accuracy of
our approach by comparing it with ADMM, PVP, DVP, and
DPSGD on empirical loss and classification error rate. Figure 6
shows that our approach outperforms PVP, DVP, and DPSGD.
Specifically, ADMM has fast convergence but is sensitive
to noise. Thus the methods directly perturbing intermediate
results in ADMM (PVP and DVP) have poor performance.
Gradient-based method (DPSGD) has good noise-resilience
property but converges slowly. Our approach is based on
ADMM framework, and combines the approximate augmented
Lagrangian function with time-varying Gaussian noise addi-
tion to achieve higher utility. Furthermore, the results in Figure
6 also show the utility-privacy trade-off of our approach: larger
ǫ and larger δ indicating weaker privacy guarantee would
result in better utility. Finally, we show the advantage of our
approach in computation cost by running time. Table II gives
the comparison and shows that DP-ADMM has much less
computation cost than all three ADMM baseline algorithms,
which is resulted from the first-order approximation used in
our approach enabling updates with closed-form solutions.
VII. RELATED WORK
The existing literature related to our work could be
categorized by: privacy-preserving empirical risk minimiza-
tion, privacy-preserving distributed learning, and variants of
ADMM.
Privacy-preserving empirical risk minimization. There
have been tremendous research efforts on privacy-preserving
empirical risk minimization [23], [29]–[31]. Most of them
focus on a centralized setting where sensitive data is collected
and stored centrally, thus the privacy leakage comes from the
final released trained model. Chaudhuri et al. [23] propose
two perturbation methods: output perturbation and objective
perturbation to guarantee ǫ-differential privacy. Bassily et
al. [29] provide a systematic investigation of differentially
private algorithms for convex empirical risk minimization and
propose efficient algorithms with tighter error bound. Wang
et al. [30] focus on a more general problem: non-convex
problem, and propose a faster algorithm based on a proximal
stochastic gradient method. Smith and Thakurta [31] explore
the stability of model selection problems, and propose two
differentially private algorithms based on perturbation stability
and subsampling stability respectively.
Privacy-preserving distributed learning. Preserving pri-
vacy in distributed learning is challenging due to fre-
quent information exchange in the iterative process. Re-
cently, much works have been done to develop privacy-
preserving distributed learning algorithms. Some of them
employ cryptography-based methods in the protocol to hide
the private information [32]–[35]. A recent work [34] uses par-
tially homomorphic cryptography in ADMM-based distributed
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Fig. 4: Impact of distributed data source number on DP-ADMM (l2-regularized logistic regression).
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Fig. 5: Convergence properties of DP-ADMM (l2-regularized logistic regression).
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Fig. 6: Accuracy comparison in empirical loss and classification error rate (l2-regularized logistic regression).
learning to preserve data privacy but the proposed approach
cannot protect the information leakage of the private user
data from the final learned models. In contrast, our approach
provides differential privacy in the final trained machine
learning models. Among the works on distributed learning
with differential privacy, most of them focus on subgradient-
based algorithms [36]–[39] and only a few works consider
ADMM-based methods [1], [2], [17]–[19]. Zhang and Zhu
[17] propose two perturbation methods: primal perturbation
and dual perturbation to guarantee dynamic differential privacy
in ADMM-based distributed learning. Zhang et al. [1] propose
to perturb the penalty parameter of ADMM to guarantee
differential privacy. Zhang et al. [2] propose recycled ADMM
with differential privacy guarantee where the results from odd
iterations could be re-utilized by the even iterations, and thus
half of updates incur no privacy leakage. Guo and Gong
[18] preserve differential privacy in the asynchronous ADMM
algorithm. We design an ADMM-based distributed learning
scheme with differential privacy which uses approximate aug-
mented Lagrangian function for all iterations and adaptively
changes the variance of added Gaussian noise in each iteration.
We also use moments accountant method to analyze the total
privacy loss to better estimate the trade-off between the data
privacy and utility. We are the first to analyze rigorously
the convergence rate and utility performance of ADMM with
differential privacy.
Variants of ADMM. Some variants of ADMM have been
proposed recently for applicability to more generous problems.
Linearized ADMM [25], [26] replaces the quadratic function
in the augmented Lagrangian function with a linearized ap-
proximation and thus provides a better way to solve subprob-
lems without closed-form solutions. Stochastic ADMM [40],
[41] considers stochastic and composite objective functions
caused by natural uncertainties in observations. Our DP-
ADMM algorithm inherits the features of linearized ADMM
and stochastic ADMM, and guarantees strong differential
privacy with good utility and low computation cost.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed an improved ADMM-
based differentially private distributed learning algorithm, DP-
ADMM, for a class of learning problems that can be for-
mulated as convex regularized empirical risk minimization.
By designing an approximate augmented Lagrangian function
and Gaussian mechanism with time-varying variance, our
11
novel approach is noise-resilient, convergent and computation-
efficient, especially under high privacy guarantee. We have
also applied the moments accountant method to analyze the
end-to-end privacy loss of the proposed iterative algorithm.
The theoretical convergence guarantee and utility bound of our
approach are derived. The evaluations on real-world datasets
have demonstrated the effectiveness of our approach in the
setting under high privacy guarantee.
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APPENDIX A
LEMMA 4 (l2 SENSITIVITY OF PRIMAL VARIABLE UPDATE IN ALGORITHM 2)
Lemma 4. Assume the objective function is smooth, R(·) is 1-strongly convex, and ‖∇ℓ(·)‖ ≤ c1. The l2 sensitivity of primal
variable update in Algorithm 2 is defined by:
max
Di,D
′
i
‖wki,Di −wki,D′
i
‖ = 2c1
(λ/n+ ρ)mi
. (40)
Proof. We define:
G(wi) = Lρ,i(wi,wk−1,γk−1i ),
g(wi) =
1
mi
ℓ(a
′
i,mi , b
′
i,mi ,wi)−
1
mi
ℓ(ai,mi , bi,mi ,wi).
According to the first step of ADMM, we have:
wki,Di =argmin
wi
G(wi), (42a)
wk
i,D
′
i
=argmin
wi
G(wi) + g(wi). (42b)
Also by assuming the smoothness of the objective function, the functions G(·) and G(·) + g(·) are smooth, thus we have:
∇G(wki,Di) = ∇G(wki,D′
i
) +∇g(wk
i,D
′
i
) = 0. (43)
Since we assume that the regularizer R(·) is 1-strongly convex, then function G(·) is (λ/n+ ρ)-strongly convex. From the
Lemma 14 of [42], we have:(∇G(wki,Di)−∇G(wki,D′
i
)
)⊺
(wki,Di −wki,D′
i
) ≥ (λ/n+ ρ)‖wki,Di −wki,D′
i
‖2. (44)
Combining this with the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, we can get:
‖wki,Di −wki,D′
i
‖ · ‖∇g(wk
i,D
′
i
)‖ ≥(∇G(wki,Di)−∇G(wki,D′
i
)
)⊺
(wki,Di −wki,D′
i
)
≥(λ/n+ ρ)‖wki,Di −wki,D′
i
‖2.
(45)
By dividing both sides of the above inequality by (λ/n+ ρ)‖wki,Di −wki,D′
i
‖, we can get:
‖wki,Di −wki,D′
i
‖ ≤
‖∇ℓ(ai,mi , bi,mi ,wki,D′
i
)−∇ℓ(a′i,mi , b
′
i,mi ,w
k
i,D
′
i
)‖
mi(λ/n+ ρ)
. (46)
As we assume that ‖∇ℓ(·)‖ ≤ c1, then we obtain the result:
max ‖wki,Di −wki,D′
i
‖ = 2c1
(λ/n+ ρ)mi
. (47)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof. We use the log moments of the privacy loss and their linear composability to get a tight bound of the total privacy loss.
The τ th log moment of the privacy loss of agent i for k-th iteration could be defined by the log moment generating function
at τ :
αki (τ) = ln
(
Ew˜k
i
[(
Pr
[
w˜ki |Di
]
Pr
[
w˜ki |D′i
])τ]). (48)
In the k-th iteration of Algorithm 3, we employ Gaussian mechanism with variance σ2i,k to achieve (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy
guarantee. We use µ0 to denote the probability density function (pdf) of N (0, σ2i,k), and µ1 to denote the pdf ofN (2c1/
(
mi(ρ+
1/ηki )
)
, σ2i,k). We obtain that α
k
i (τ) by α
k
i (τ) = ln
(
max(E1, E2)
)
, where
E1 = Ez∼µ0
[(
µ0(z)
µ1(z)
)τ]
and E2 = Ez∼µ1
[(
µ1(z)
µ0(z)
)τ]
.
13
Since,
Ez∼µ0
[
(
µ0(z)
µ1(z)
)τ
]
=exp
(
τ(τ + 1)ǫ2
4 ln(1.25/δ)
)
, (49a)
Ez∼µ1
[
(
µ1(z)
µ0(z)
)τ
]
=exp
(
τ(τ + 1)ǫ2
4 ln(1.25/δ)
)
, (49b)
we have:
αki (τ) =
τ(τ + 1)ǫ2
4 ln(1.25/δ)
. (50)
According to Theorem 2 (linear composability) in [20], we have the τ th log moment of the overall privacy loss from i:
αi(τ) =
t∑
k=1
αki (τ) =
tτ(τ + 1)ǫ2
4 ln(1.25/δ)
. (51)
We aim to prove that our proposed algorithm DP-ADMM (Algorithm 3) achieves (ǫ¯, δ)-differential privacy. According to
Theorem 2 (tail bound) in [20], we have:
δ = min
τ∈Z+
exp(αi(τ)− τ ǫ¯) = min
τ∈Z+
exp
(
tτ(τ + 1)ǫ2
4 ln(1.25/δ)
− τ ǫ¯
)
.
Since δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a positive integer τ to make tτ(τ + 1)ǫ2/(4 ln(1.25/δ)) − τ ǫ¯ < 0. Furthermore, tτ(τ +
1)ǫ2/
(
4 ln(1.25/δ)
)− τ ǫ¯ is a quadratic function w.r.t. τ . Thus, if there is a solution to the above minimization problem, we
must have: when τ = 1,
tτ(τ + 1)ǫ2
4 ln(1.25/δ)
− τ ǫ¯ = tǫ
2
2 ln(1.25/δ)
− ǫ¯ < 0. (52)
Therefore, we obtain:
tǫ2
2 ln(1.25/δ)
< ǫ¯. (53)
The minimum of tx(x + 1)ǫ2/
(
4 ln(1.25/δ)
)− xǫ¯ is −tǫ2/(16 ln(1.25/δ))+ ǫ¯/2− ǫ¯2 ln(1.25/δ)/(tǫ2) when x ∈ R. Thus:
ln(δ) = min
τ∈Z+
(
tτ(τ + 1)ǫ2
4 ln(1.25/δ)
− τ ǫ¯
)
≥ − tǫ
2
16 ln(1.25/δ)
+
ǫ¯
2
− ǫ¯
2 ln(1.25/δ)
tǫ2
(54)
From (53) and (54), we obtain:
ln(1/δ) ≤ −3ǫ¯
8
+
ǫ¯2 ln(1.25/δ)
tǫ2
≤ ǫ¯
2 ln(1.25/δ)
tǫ2
, (55)
which leads to the following inequality:
ǫ¯ ≥
√
t ln(1/δ)
ln(1.25/δ)
ǫ. (56)
Therefore, there exists a constant c0, the overall privacy loss ǫ¯ satisfies:
ǫ¯ = c0
√
tǫ. (57)
APPENDIX C
LEMMA 5 USED IN THE PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Lemma 5. Assume L(·) is a convex differentiable function. s ≥ 0 is a scalar. For any vector x ∈ Rd and y ∈ Rd, we denote
their Bregman divergence as D(x,y) = h(x)−h(y)−〈∇h(y),x−y〉, where h(·) is a continuously-differentiable real-valued
and strictly convex function. If we define:
x∗ = argmin
x
L(x) + sD(x,y), (58)
then 〈∇L(x∗),x∗ − x〉 ≤ s(D(x,y)−D(x,x∗)−D(x∗,y)). (59)
Proof. According to the optimality condition,〈∇L(x∗) + s∇D(x∗,y),x− x∗〉 ≥ 0. (60)
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Then, 〈∇L(x∗),x∗ − x〉 ≤s〈∇D(x∗,y),x− x∗〉
=s
〈∇h(x∗)−∇h(y),x− x∗〉
=s
(
D(x,y)−D(x,x∗)−D(x∗,y)). (61)
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof. Since we assume that ℓ(·) and R(·) are convex, the function fi(·) is convex. Due to the convexity of fi(·), we have:
fi(w˜
k−1
i )− fi(wi) ≤
〈
f
′
i (w˜
k−1
i ), w˜
k−1
i −wi
〉
, (62)
which can lead to:
fi(w˜
k−1
i )− fi(wi) +
〈
w˜ki −wi,−γki
〉 ≤〈f ′i (w˜k−1i ), w˜k−1i −wi〉+ 〈w˜ki −wi,−γki 〉
=
〈
f
′
i (w˜
k−1
i )− (ρ+ 1/ηki )ξki , w˜k−1i − w˜ki
〉− (ρ+ 1/ηki )〈ξki ,wi − w˜k−1i 〉
+
〈
f
′
i (w˜
k−1
i )− γki − (ρ+ 1/ηki )ξki , w˜ki −wi
〉
.
(63)
According to the Line 10 of Algorithm 3, we have:〈
f
′
i (w˜
k−1
i )− γki − (ρ+ 1/ηki )ξki , w˜ki −wi
〉
=
〈
f
′
i (w˜
k−1
i )− γk−1i + ρ(w˜ki −wk−1)− (ρ+ 1/ηki )ξki , w˜ki −wi
〉
+
〈
w˜ki −wi, ρ(wk−1 −wk)
〉
.
(64)
By combining (63) and (64), we obtain:
fi(w˜
k−1
i )− fi(wi) +
〈
w˜ki −wi,−γki
〉 ≤〈f ′i (w˜k−1i )− (ρ+ 1/ηki )ξki , w˜k−1i − w˜ki 〉
+
〈
f
′
i (w˜
k−1
i )− γk−1i + ρ(w˜ki −wk−1)− (ρ+ 1/ηki )ξki , w˜ki −wi
〉
+
〈
w˜ki −wi, ρ(wk−1 −wk)
〉− (ρ+ 1/ηki )〈ξki ,wi − w˜k−1i 〉.
(65)
We handle the last three terms separately. Firstly, we have:〈
w˜ki −wi, ρ(wk−1 −wk)
〉
=
ρ
2
(‖wi −wk−1‖2 − ‖wi −wk‖2)+ ρ
2
(‖w˜ki −wk‖2 − ‖w˜ki −wk−1‖2)
≤ρ
2
(‖wi −wk−1‖2 − ‖wi −wk‖2)+ ρ
2
‖w˜ki −wk‖
2
=
ρ
2
(‖wi −wk−1‖2 − ‖wi −wk‖2)+ 1
2ρ
‖γki − γk−1i ‖
2
.
(66)
According to the Line 4 and 6 of Algorithm 3, w˜ki is equal to the solution to minwi
〈
f
′
i (w˜
k−1
i ),wi − w˜k−1i
〉− 〈γk−1i ,wi −
wk−1
〉
+ρ‖wi −wk−1‖2/2+‖wi − w˜k−1i ‖
2
/(2ηki )− (ρ+1/ηki )ξkiwi. By applying Lemma 5 where D(x,y) = 12‖x− y‖2,
s = 1/ηki , and L(x) =
〈
f
′
i (w˜
k−1
i ),x− w˜k−1i
〉− 〈γk−1i ,x−wk−1〉+ ρ‖x−wk−1‖2/2− (ρ+ 1/ηki )ξkiwi, we have:〈
f
′
i (w˜
k−1
i )− γk−1i + ρ(w˜ki −wk−1)− (ρ+ 1/ηki )ξki , w˜ki −wi
〉 ≤ 1
2ηki
(‖wi − w˜k−1i ‖2 − ‖wi − w˜ki ‖2 − ‖w˜ki − w˜k−1i ‖2).
(67)
Lastly, based on Young’s inequality, we have:
〈
f
′
i (w˜
k−1
i )− (ρ+ 1/ηki )ξki , w˜k−1i − w˜ki
〉 ≤ ηki
2
∥∥f ′i (w˜k−1i )− (ρ+ 1/ηki )ξki ∥∥2 + 12ηki ‖w˜ki − w˜k−1i ‖
2
. (68)
Combining (65),(66),(67), and (68), we have:
fi(w˜
k−1
i )− fi(wi) +
〈
w˜ki −wi,−γki
〉 ≤ηki
2
‖f ′i (w˜k−1i )− (ρ+ 1/ηki )ξki ‖
2 − (ρ+ 1/ηki )〈ξki ,wi − w˜k−1i 〉
+
1
2ηki
(‖wi − w˜k−1i ‖2 − ‖wi − w˜ki ‖2)
+
ρ
2
(‖wi −wk−1‖2 − ‖wi −wk‖2) + 1
2ρ
‖γki − γk−1i ‖
2
.
(69)
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Next, according to our algorithm where γki = γ
k−1
i − ρ(w˜ki −wk) and wk = 1n
∑n
i=1 w˜
k
i − 1n
∑n
i=1 γ
k−1
i /ρ, we have:
n∑
i=1
〈
wk −w,γki
〉
= 0. (70)
And also, we could obtain:〈
γki − γi, w˜ki −wk
〉
=
1
ρ
〈
γki − γi,γk−1i − γki
〉
=
1
2ρ
(‖γi − γk−1i ‖2 − ‖γi − γki ‖2 − ‖γki − γk−1i ‖2). (71)
Thus, combining (69), (70) and (71), we obtain the result in the Lemma 2:
n∑
i=1
(
fi(w˜
k−1
i )− fi(wi) + (uki − ui)
⊺
F (uki )
)
=
n∑
i=1
(
fi(w˜
k−1
i )− fi(wi) +
〈− γki , w˜ki −wi〉+ 〈γki ,wk −w〉+ 〈γki − γi, w˜ki −wk〉
)
≤
n∑
i=1
(
ηki
2
‖f ′i (w˜k−1i )− (ρ+ 1/ηki )ξki ‖
2 − (ρ+ 1/ηki )〈ξki ,wi − w˜k−1i 〉+ ρ2(‖wi −wk−1‖2 − ‖wi −wk‖2)
+
1
2ηki
(‖wi − w˜k−1i ‖2 − ‖wi − w˜ki ‖2)+ 12ρ‖γi − γk−1i ‖2 − 12ρ‖γi − γki ‖2
)
.
(72)
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof. According to the convexity of fi(·) and the monotonicity of the operator F (·), and applying Lemma 2, we have:
n∑
i=1
(
fi(w¯
t
i)− fi(wi) + (u¯ti − ui)⊺F (u¯ti)
)
=
n∑
i=1
(
fi(w¯
t
i)− fi(wi) +
〈− γ¯ti, w¯ti −wi〉+ 〈γ¯ti, w¯t −w〉+ 〈γ¯ti − γi, w¯ti − w¯t〉
)
≤1
t
t∑
k=1
n∑
i=1
(
fi(w˜
k−1
i )− fi(wi) + (uki − ui)
⊺
F (uki )
)
=
1
t
t∑
k=1
n∑
i=1
(
fi(w˜
k−1
i )− fi(wi) +
〈− γki , w˜ki −wi〉+ 〈γki ,wk −w〉+ 〈γki − γi, w˜ki −wk〉
)
≤
n∑
i=1
1
t
t∑
k=1
(
ηki
2
∥∥f ′i (w˜ki )− (ρ+ 1/ηki )ξki ∥∥2 − (ρ+ 1/ηki )〈ξki ,wi − w˜k−1i 〉
)
+
1
t
n∑
i=1
(
1
2ηt
∥∥wi − w˜0i∥∥2 + ρ2‖wi −w0‖2 + 12ρ‖γi − γ0i ‖2
)
.
(73)
Let (wi,w) be the optimal solution (w
∗
i ,w
∗) in the above inequality. We get:
n∑
i=1
(
fi(w¯
t
i)− fi(w∗i ) +
〈− γ¯ti, w¯ti −w∗i 〉+ 〈γ¯ti, w¯t −w∗〉+ 〈γ¯ti − γi, w¯ti − w¯t〉
)
≤
n∑
i=1
1
t
t∑
k=1
ηki
2
∥∥f ′i (w˜k−1i )− (ρ+ 1/ηki )ξki ∥∥2 −
n∑
i=1
1
t
t∑
k=1
(
ρ+ 1/ηki
)〈
ξki ,w
∗
i − w˜k−1i
〉
+
1
t
n∑
i=1
c2w
2ηti
+
n
t
ρ
2
c2w +
1
t
n∑
i=1
1
2ρ
‖γi − γ0i ‖2.
(74)
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The above inequality holds for all γi, thus it also holds for γi ∈ {γi : ‖γi‖ ≤ β}. By letting γi be the optimal solution, we
have the maximum of the left side of the above inequality:
max
{γi:‖γi‖≤β}
n∑
i=1
(
fi(w¯
t
i)− fi(w∗i ) +
〈− γ¯ti, w¯ti −w∗i 〉+ 〈γ¯ti, w¯t −w∗〉+ 〈γ¯ti − γi, w¯ti − w¯t〉
)
= max
{γi:‖γi‖≤β}
n∑
i=1
(
fi(w¯
t
i)− fi(wi)− γi(w¯ti − w¯t)
)
=
n∑
i=1
(
fi(w¯
t
i)− fi(wi)− max
{γi:‖γi‖≤β}
γi(w¯
t
i − w¯t)
)
=
n∑
i=1
(
fi(w¯
t
i)− fi(wi) + β(‖w¯ti − w¯t‖)
)
.
(75)
And we also get the maximum of the right side:
n∑
i=1
1
t
t∑
k=1
ηki
2
∥∥f ′i (w˜k−1i )− (ρ+ 1/ηki )ξki ∥∥2 −
n∑
i=1
1
t
t∑
k=1
(
ρ+ 1/ηki
)〈
ξki ,w
∗
i − w˜k−1i
〉
+
1
t
n∑
i=1
c2w
2ηti
+
ρn
2t
c2w + max
{γi:‖γi‖≤β}
1
t
n∑
i=1
1
2ρ
‖γi − γ0i ‖2
=
n∑
i=1
1
t
t∑
k=1
ηki
2
∥∥f ′i (w˜k−1i )− (ρ+ 1/ηki )ξki ∥∥2 −
n∑
i=1
1
t
t∑
k=1
(
ρ+ 1/ηki
)〈
ξki ,w
∗
i − w˜k−1i
〉
+
1
t
n∑
i=1
c2w
2ηti
+
ρn
2t
c2w +
n
t
β2
2ρ
.
(76)
Thus, we obtain the inequality:
n∑
i=1
(
fi(w¯
t
i)− fi(wi) + β‖w¯ti − w¯t‖
)
≤
n∑
i=1
1
t
t∑
k=1
ηki
2
∥∥f ′i (w˜k−1i )− (ρ+ 1/ηki )ξki ∥∥2 −
n∑
i=1
1
t
t∑
k=1
(
ρ+ 1/ηki
)〈
ξ
k
i ,w
∗
i − w˜k−1i
〉
+
1
t
n∑
i=1
c2w
2ηti
+
ρn
2t
c2w +
n
t
β2
2ρ
.
(77)
Since we assume ‖ℓ′(·)‖ ≤ c1 and ‖R′(·)‖ ≤ c2, we have E
[∥∥f ′i (w˜k−1i ) − (ρ + 1/ηki )ξki ∥∥2] = (c1 + λc2/n)2 +
8dpc21 ln (1.25/δ)/
(
m2i ǫ
2
)
. With E
[〈
ξki ,w
∗
i − w˜k−1i
〉]
= 0 and ηki = cw
(
2k(c1+λc2/n)
2+16kdpc21 ln (1.25/δ)/
(
m2i ǫ
2
))− 12 ,
by taking expectation of the inequality (77), we obtain:
E
[ n∑
i=1
(
fi(w¯
t
i)− fi(w∗i ) + β‖w¯ti − w¯t‖
)]
≤
n∑
i=1
1
t
t∑
k=1
E
[
ηki
2
‖f ′i (w˜k−1i )− (ρ+ 1/ηki )ξki ‖
2
]
−
n∑
i=1
1
t
t∑
k=1
(
ρ+ 1/ηki
)
E
[〈
ξki ,w
∗
i − w˜k−1i
〉]
+
1
t
n∑
i=1
c2w
2ηti
+
ρn
2t
c2w +
n
t
β2
2ρ
,
(78)
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which leads to the result in the theorem:
E
[ n∑
i=1
(
fi(w¯
t
i)− fi(w∗i ) + β‖w¯ti − w¯t‖
)]
=
n∑
i=1
1
t
t∑
k=1
cw
2
√
2k
√
(c1 + λc2/n)2 +
8dpc21 ln (1.25/δ)
m2i ǫ
2
+
n∑
i=1
1
t
t∑
k=1
cw
√
2t
2
√
(c1 + λc2/n)2 +
8dpc21 ln (1.25/δ)
m2i ǫ
2
+
nρ
2t
c2w +
nβ2
2ρt
=
n∑
i=1
cw
2
√
2t
√
(c1 + λc2/n)2 +
8dpc21 ln (1.25/δ)
m2i ǫ
2
( t∑
k=1
1√
k
+ 2
√
t
)
+
nρ
2t
c2w +
nβ2
2ρt
≤
n∑
i=1
√
2cw√
t
√
(c1 + λc2/n)2 +
8dpc21 ln (1.25/δ)
m2i ǫ
2
+
n(ρc2w + β
2/ρ)
2t
.
(79)
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Proof. As we assume that ℓ(·) andR(·) are smooth and convex, ∥∥∇2ℓ(·)∥∥ ≤ c3, and ∥∥∇2R(·)∥∥ ≤ c4, thus we have ∥∥∇2fi(·)∥∥ =∥∥∇2ℓ(·) + λ/n∇2R(·)∥∥ ≤ c3 + λc4/n is bounded. This leads to:∥∥∇fi(x)−∇fi(y)∥∥ ≤ (c3 + λc4/n)∥∥x− y∥∥. (80)
Thus, fi(·) is (c3 + λc4/n)-Lipschitz smooth. According to the property of Lipschitz smooth, we have:
fi(w˜
k
i ) ≤fi(w˜k−1i ) +
〈∇fi(w˜k−1i ), w˜ki − w˜k−1i 〉+ c3 + λc4/n2 ‖w˜ki − w˜k−1i ‖2
=fi(w˜
k−1
i ) +
(
ρ+ 1/ηki
)〈
ξki , w˜
k
i − w˜k−1i
〉
+
c3 + λc4/n
2
‖w˜ki − w˜k−1i ‖
2
+
〈∇fi(w˜k−1i )− (ρ+ 1/ηki )ξki , w˜ki − w˜k−1i 〉.
(81)
Due to the convexity of fi(·), we have:
fi(w˜
k
i )− fi(wi) ≤
〈∇fi(w˜ki ), w˜ki −wi〉. (82)
According to (81) and (82), we have:
fi(w˜
k
i )− fi(wi) +
〈
w˜ki −wi,−γki
〉 ≤fi(w˜k−1i )− fi(wi) + (ρ+ 1/ηki )〈ξki , w˜ki − w˜k−1i 〉
+
〈∇fi(w˜k−1i )− (ρ+ 1/ηki )ξki , w˜ki − w˜k−1i 〉
+
c3 + λc4/n
2
‖w˜ki − w˜k−1i ‖
2
+
〈
w˜ki −wi,−γki
〉
,
(83)
which leads to:
fi(w˜
k
i )− fi(wi) +
〈
w˜ki −wi,−γki
〉 ≤〈∇fi(w˜k−1i )− γki − (ρ+ 1/ηki )ξki + ρ(w˜ki −wk−1), w˜ki −wi〉
+
(
ρ+ 1/ηki
)〈
ξki , w˜
k
i − w˜k−1i
〉
+
c3 + λc4/n
2
‖w˜ki − w˜k−1i ‖
2
+
〈
w˜ki −wi, ρ(wk−1 −wk)
〉− (ρ+ 1/ηki )〈ξki ,wi − w˜k−1i 〉.
(84)
Based on Young’s inequality,
〈
(ρ+ 1/ηki )ξ
k
i , w˜
k
i − w˜k−1i
〉 ≤ 1
2(1/ηki − (c3 + λc4/n))
∥∥(ρ+ 1/ηki )ξki ∥∥2 + 1/ηki − (c3 + λc4/n)2
∥∥w˜ki − w˜k−1i ∥∥2. (85)
Combining (66), (67), (84) and (85), we have:
fi(w˜
k
i )− fi(wi) +
〈
w˜ki −wi,−γki
〉 ≤ (ρ+ 1/ηki )2
2(1/ηki − (c3 + λc4/n))
∥∥ξki ∥∥2 − (ρ+ 1/ηki )〈ξki ,wi − w˜k−1i 〉
+
1
2ηki
(‖wi − w˜k−1i ‖
2 − ‖wi − w˜ki ‖
2
)
+
ρ
2
(‖wi −wk−1‖2 − ‖wi −wk‖2) + 1
2ρ
‖γki − γk−1i ‖
2
.
(86)
18
Combining (86), (70) and (71), we get the result as desired:
n∑
i=1
(
fi(w˜
k
i )− fi(wi) + (uki − ui)
⊺
F (uki )
)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
fi(w˜
k
i )− fi(wi) +
〈− γki , w˜ki −wi〉+ 〈γki ,wk −w〉+ 〈γki − γi, w˜ki −wk〉
)
≤
n∑
i=1
( (
ρ+ 1/ηki
)2
2(1/ηki − (c3 + λc4/n))
∥∥ξki ∥∥2 − (ρ+ 1/ηki )〈ξki ,wi − w˜k−1i 〉+ 12ηki (‖wi − w˜k−1i ‖
2 − ‖wi − w˜ki ‖
2
)
+
ρ
2
(‖wi −wk−1‖2 − ‖wi −wk‖2) + 1
2ρ
(‖γi − γk−1i ‖
2 − ‖γi − γki ‖
2
)
)
.
(87)
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof. According to the convexity of fi(·) and the monotonicity of F (·), and applying Lemma 3, we have:
n∑
i=1
(
fi(w¯
t
i)− fi(wi) + (u¯ti − ui)⊺F (u¯ti)
)
=
n∑
i=1
(
fi(w¯
t
i)− fi(wi) +
〈− γ¯ti, w¯ti −wi〉+ 〈γ¯ti, w¯t −w〉+ 〈γ¯ti − γi, w¯ti − w¯t〉
)
≤1
t
t∑
k=1
n∑
i=1
(
fi(w˜
k
i )− fi(wi) + (uki − ui)
⊺
F (uki )
)
=
1
t
t∑
k=1
n∑
i=1
(
fi(w˜
k
i )− fi(wi) +
〈− γki , w˜ki −wi〉+ 〈γki ,wk −w〉+ 〈γki − γi, w˜ki −wk〉
)
≤
n∑
i=1
1
t
t∑
k=1
( (
ρ+ 1/ηki
)2
2(1/ηki − (c3 + λc4/n))
∥∥ξki ∥∥2 − (ρ+ 1/ηki )〈ξki ,wi − w˜k−1i 〉
)
+
1
t
n∑
i=1
(
1
2ηti
‖wi − w˜0i ‖
2
+
ρ
2
‖wi −w0‖2 + 1
2ρ
‖γi − γ0i ‖2
)
.
(88)
By letting (wi,w) be the optimal solution (w
∗
i ,w
∗), we have:
n∑
i=1
(
fi(w¯
t
i)− fi(w∗i ) +
〈− γ¯ti, w¯ti −w∗i 〉+ 〈γ¯ti, w¯t −w∗〉+ 〈γ¯ti − γi, w¯ti − w¯t〉
)
=
n∑
i=1
1
t
t∑
k=1
( (
ρ+ 1/ηki
)2
2(1/ηki − (c3 + λc4/n))
∥∥ξki ∥∥2 − (ρ+ 1/ηki )〈ξki ,w∗i − w˜k−1i 〉
)
+
1
t
n∑
i=1
c2w
2ηti
+
ρn
2t
c2w +
1
t
n∑
i=1
1
2ρ
‖γi − γ0i ‖2.
(89)
The above inequality holds for all γi, thus it also holds for γi ∈ {γi : ‖γi‖ ≤ β}. By letting γi be the optimum, we have
max
{γi:‖γi‖≤β}
n∑
i=1
(
fi(w¯
t
i)− fi(w∗i ) +
〈− γ¯ti, w¯ti −w∗i 〉+ 〈γ¯ti, w¯t −w∗〉+ 〈γ¯ti − γi, w¯ti − w¯t〉
)
= max
{γi:‖γi‖≤β}
n∑
i=1
(
fi(w¯
t
i)− fi(wi)− γi(w¯ti − w¯t)
)
=
n∑
i=1
(
fi(w¯
t
i)− fi(wi) + β‖w¯ti − w¯t‖
)
.
(90)
Since we have E
[〈
ξki ,w
∗
i − w˜k−1i
〉]
= 0 and E
[∥∥ξki ∥∥2] = dpσ2i,k = 8dp ln(1.25/δ)c21/(m2i ǫ2(ρ+ 1/ηki )2) due to the variance
definition, we take the expectation of the (90) and let ηki =
(
c3 + λc4/n+ 2c1
√
4dpk ln(1.25/δ)/
(
ǫmicw
))−1
, which leads
19
to the result:
E
[ n∑
i=1
(
fi(w¯
t
i)− fi(w∗i ) + β
∥∥w¯ti − w¯t∥∥)
]
≤E
[ n∑
i=1
1
t
t∑
k=1
(
ρ+ 1/ηki
)2
2(1/ηki − (c3 + λc4/n))
∥∥ξki ∥∥2
]
−
n∑
i=1
1
t
t∑
k=1
(
ρ+ 1/ηki
)
E
[〈
ξki ,w
∗
i − w˜k−1i
〉]
+
1
t
n∑
i=1
c2w
2ηti
+
ρn
2t
c2w + max
{γi:‖γi‖≤β}
1
t
n∑
i=1
1
2ρ
‖γi − γ0i ‖2
=
n∑
i=1
cwc1
√
dp ln(1.25/δ)
miǫt
( t∑
k=1
1√
k
+ 2
√
t
)
+
nc2w(c3 + λc4/n)
2t
+
ρn
2t
c2w +
n
t
β2
2ρ
≤
n∑
i=1
4cwc1
√
dp ln(1.25/δ)
miǫ
√
t
+
nc2w(c3 + λc4/n)
2
+
nc2wρ+ nβ
2/ρ
2
.
(91)
